_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._ "I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is as the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_, than to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the most agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or _choice_. "The will is as the most agreeable,"--that is, _the determination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of the consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and as the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect, following volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or read, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the "mind's choice,"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the terms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This is still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the desire_. "The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most agreeable," and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is affected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is chosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the simple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are correlatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be the most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with the sense of the most agreeable. _Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._