"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in or about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.) Choice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that is, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect agreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect agreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in determining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the mind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in relation to each. I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or choice, will depend upon,-- 1. The beauty of the object, "viewing it as it is _in itself_," independently of circumstances. 2. "The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or _the consequence_ of it," or the object taken with its "concomitants" and consequences. 3. "The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with respect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed." (p. 22.) II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first, upon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind. Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future pleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two respects: 1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the pleasure; 2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind has of it. Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees of pleasure, considered in itself; and "the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good." (p. 23.) Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also upon "the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice." (p. 24.) Here we have to consider "the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion." (ibid.)