Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state of the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already mentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the _manner of the view_. "Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter," he remarks, "the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the _manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively." (ibid.) In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two, choice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to _the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the most agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that, having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation to _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of mind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an example,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and agreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical language, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this: the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition. Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of