A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_,
but an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies "in cases wherein
no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very
nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or
endeavour." (ibid.) Thus it is used "with respect to God's existence
before the creation of the world, when there was no other being."
"_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from
certainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things
in themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or
that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition
which affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than
the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject
and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and
in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when
I endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_."
(p. 27, 28, 29.)
"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence
of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several
ways."
"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_.
So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is
necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four."
2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence
of something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain.
3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain
_consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be
"consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_
with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a
necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity.
"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which
will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are
necessary only in this last way,"--that is, "by a connexion with
something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already
is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to
controversies about acts of the will." (p. 30.)
Philosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. "The existence
of a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when
all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its
existence." This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account