2. _Particular_ necessity refers to "things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case. "What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and _necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms _impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.) _Inability and Unable._ "It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or motives. _Contingent and Contingency._ "Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.) Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use, contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper place. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them. Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and Inability. We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and volition necessary?