ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions and certain effects. Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a _real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain effects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of effects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected." Edwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability. "A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and the act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to the consequents of the choice. "A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding. "A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust." There is here a correlation between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and circumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite. "A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last.