"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_ is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all correlated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is _utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions. Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good volitions. _General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._ The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.) The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.) An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has become correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it."