"For the good results from the due performance of functions (Prop. IV); but the Good is a state of consciousness (Prop. II), therefore the Good is the state of consciousness which results from the due performance of functions (as such). Hence (by Definition), the Good is Pleasure. "_Obs._--By our definitions of Good and Pleasure it was evident that they were coextensive, being both marks of the same thing; to prove their identity it was necessary to show that Good is a state of consciousness." Of these propositions Barratt says that I and II are perhaps the most important, since they assert the impossibility of Transcendentalism. _Part Second_ of "Physical Ethics" is a "Verification by Special Experience." THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL SENSE The assumption of a moral sense has already been made in the definition of Good as the object of Approbation. Our previous reasoning would lead us nevertheless to guess that this sense is not, in its nature, a simple and indecomposable faculty. How, then, did this sense arise, and what is its nature and composition? In the lowest animal organization, there are merely vague and indefinite states of consciousness corresponding to the undeveloped state of physical function. With the development and specialization of advancing evolution arises Perception; by which likeness and unlikeness among sensations are distinguished, and classification is begun. "At first only the most obvious resemblances are noticed, but as experience progresses, wider and wider classes ever tend to be formed, till at last we arrive at those highest ideas which are coextensive with experience. These, though the last in order of birth, become the starting-points of science--just as men formed the idea of stones falling long before they discovered the law of attraction, yet by that law they afterwards 'explain' the former fact. Thus we trace the whole of Perception or Knowledge to this power of comparison and noting likenesses, and this we see to be coincident with the organization of consciousness into central meeting-places or ganglia, in which different sensations are presented to a common tribunal and so compared together. We see, therefore, that Perception does not originate consciousness; it only organizes and develops it. We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr. Herbert Spencer, who will not allow consciousness to the lowest animals."[63] The process of perception or Knowledge works, not only on states of consciousness themselves, but on the changes from one state to another, or, in other words, on relations. Thus results, on the one hand, recognition of objects; on the other, argument and reasoning, for the most abstruse reasoning is nothing more than a classification of relations.