"And as the result of a motive is in no way dependent on its external source, so neither is it influenced by its mode of internal operation. A motive may be strong either by its own natural force as a large excess of associated pleasure in one direction, or by the facility artificially given to its expression by the long-continued custom, either in ourselves or in our fathers, of acting in a certain way on certain occasions. In other words, the strength of a motive is not absolute, it is relative to the habits and predispositions of our organisms; but the strongest motive, whatever its kind, prevails in all cases. "Obligation is often, again, confounded with compulsion: but submission to physical force is not morally an act at all, because its [Greek: arche] or immediate antecedent is external to us, and therefore independent of our moral laws." OF PLEASURES THAT ARE CALLED BAD "We saw that Good differs from Pleasure simply by a widening of the field of calculation; whereby the pleasure of the moment is often found to entail future pain greater than itself (allowance being made for perspective), and is therefore condemned as Bad. When, therefore, we speak of Pleasure as opposed to Good, we always mean the pleasure of the moment; or very often by a still further narrowing of the term, sensual as opposed to intellectual pleasures." FOOTNOTES: [63] Pp. 39, 40. [64] P. 73. LESLIE STEPHEN "THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS" (1882) While with regard to the matter of Ethics,--the general classifications of right and wrong conduct,--moralists are almost unanimous, with regard to its form,--the essence and criterion of right and wrong,--there is great disagreement. All widely spread opinions deserve respect by their mere existence; they are phenomena to be accounted for. On the subject of morals, as on all other subjects, opinions gradually modify and approach each other; but a perfect agreement will probably not be arrived at.