The application of these general principles to the particular case of ourselves and Germany is easy. Germany’s exports are so preponderantly competitive with ours, that, if her exports are forcibly stimulated, it is certain that she will have to sell goods against us. This is not altered by the fact that it is possible to pick out a few exports or potential exports, such as potash or sugar, which are not competitive. If Germany is to have a _large_ surplus of exports over imports, she must increase her competitive sales. In the _Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (pp. 175–185) I demonstrated this at some length on the basis of pre–war statistics. I showed not only that the goods she must sell, but the markets she must sell them in, were largely competitive with our own. The statistics of post–war trade show that the former argument still holds good. The following table shows the proportions in which her export trade was divided between the principal articles of export, (1) in 1913, (2) in the first nine months of 1920 (the latest period for which I have figures in this precise form), and (3) in the four months June to September 1921, these last figures representing, I think, a not exactly comparable classification, and being provisional only: ──────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────── │ Percentage of Total Exports. German Exports. ├───────┬────────────┬───────────── │ 1913. │ 1920 │ 1921 │ │(Jan.─Sept.)│ (June─Sept.) ──────────────────────────────────┼───────┼────────────┼───────────── Iron and steel goods │ 13.2 │ 20 │ 22 Machinery (including motor cars) │ 7.5 │ 12 │ 17 Chemicals and dies │ 4 │ 13 │ 9.5 Fuel │ 7 │ 6.5 │ ? Paper goods │ 2.5 │ 4 │ 3.5 Electrical goods │ 2 │ 3.5 │ ? Silk goods │ 2 │ 3 │} Cotton goods │ 5.5 │ 3 │} 15 Woolen goods │ 6 │ .. │} Glass │ .5 │ 2.5 │ 2 Leather goods │ 3 │ 2 │ 4 Copper goods │ 1.5 │ 1.5 │ ? ──────────────────────────────────┴───────┴────────────┴─────────────