And because Laughing and Pleasure has such an unlimited Prerogative upon the _Stage_, I shall add a Citation or two from _Aristotle_ concerning this Matter. Now this great Man 'calls those Buffoons, and Impertinents, who rally without any regard to Persons or Things, to Decency, or good Manners. That there is a great difference between Ribaldry, and handsom Rallying. He that would perform exactly, must keep within the Character of Virtue, and Breeding. He goes on, and tells us that the old Comedians entertain'd the Audience with Smut, but the Modern ones avoided that Liberty, and grew more reserv'd. This latter way he says was much more proper and Gentile then the other. That in his Opinion Rallying, no less than Railing, ought to be under the Discipline of Law; That he who is ridden by his _Jests_, and minds nothing but the business of _Laughing_, is himself Ridiculous. And that a Man of Education and Sense, is so far from going these Lengths that he wont so much as endure the hearing some sort of Buffoonry.'[325] And as to the point of Delight in general, the same Author affirms, 'that scandalous Satisfactions are not properly Pleasures. 'Tis only Distemper, and false Appetite which makes them palatable. And a Man that is sick, seldom has his Tast true. Besides, supposing we throw Capacity out of the Question, and make Experiment and Sensation the Judge; Granting this, we ought not to chop at every Bait, nor Fly out at every Thing that strikes the Fancy. The meer Agreableness must not overbear us, without distinguishing upon the Quality, and the Means. Pleasure how charming soever, must not be fetched out of Vice. An Estate is a pretty thing, but if we purchase by Falshood, and Knavery, we pay too much for't. Some Pleasures, are Childish and others abominable; And upon the whole, Pleasure, absolutely speaking, is no good Thing.'[326] And so much for the Philosopher. And because _Ribaldry_ is used for Sport, a passage or two from _Quintilian_, may not be unseasonable. This Orator does not only Condemn the grosser Instances, but cuts off all the _Double-Entendre's_ at a Blow. He comes up to the Regularity of Thought, and tells us 'that the Meaning, as well as the Words of Discourse must be unsullied.'[327] And in the same _Chapter_ he adds that 'A Man of Probity has always a Reserve in his Freedoms, and Converses within the Rules of Modesty, and Character. And that Mirth at the expence of Virtue, is an Over-purchase,' _Nimium enim risus pretium est si probitatis impendio constat_.