A Theological-Political Treatise [Part IV]Spinoza, Benedictus de
PhilosophyPhilosophy
A Theological-Political Treatise [Part IV]
Spinoza, Benedictus de
Free thought -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800
(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual
is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in
so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the
Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,
wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will
retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will;
otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he
will be bound unwillingly to obey him.
(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of
natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if
each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the
latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to
obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body politic of this
kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields
all its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any
laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of
things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all
their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) For if
they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken
precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,
and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining
the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign
power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and
necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and
will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a
primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.
(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion
and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will,
so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost
their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it
and can keep it. (51) Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose
thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own
interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and
acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "violenta
imperia nemo continuit diu." (52) No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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