A Theological-Political Treatise [Part IV]Spinoza, Benedictus de
PhilosophyPhilosophy
A Theological-Political Treatise [Part IV]
Spinoza, Benedictus de
Free thought -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800
(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for
it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a
large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis
and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring
men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in
peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.
(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of
subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right
save that which it sanctions.
[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into
slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this
idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away
by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act
accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire
guidance of reason.
(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain
sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the
object of the action. (57) If the object of the action be the good of the
state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does
himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole
people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the
sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a
subject. (58) Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on
sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free [Endnote
27]; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.
(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their
parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to
the children's benefit.
(60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a
son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. (61) A slave is one
who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in
the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given
in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power,
given for the common interest, wherein he is included.
(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a
democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all
forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual
liberty. (63) In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he
has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a
society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state
of nature, equals.
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