should be deemed guilty, not only of military disobedience, but of high treason. Such decisive measures were rendered necessary, in consequence of the equivocal loyalty of many who held municipal and military rank in the Netherlands. The king had prudently invested Wellington with these important powers, and no man could have exercised them more effectively. The French court (Louis XVIII and his suite) received advice how to save themselves by retiring to Antwerp, in case the enemy should succeed in turning the British right: they were desired to be in no alarm, nor to be startled by mere rumours, but to await positive information. Having thus provided for the military wants, and even for the _fears_ of those behind him, the Duke devoted his whole attention to the army; and in proportion as the storm approached, repeated his warnings to the Prussians, by incessant dispatches to sir Henry Hardinge. He also sent frequent instructions to his own officers who were the nearest to the enemy, to keep on the alert. The regiment I belonged to disembarked at Ostend on the 21st of April, and we soon found there was work in hand. Swords were to be ground and well pointed, and the frequent inspections of arms, ammunition, camp equipage, etc., plainly announced that we were shortly about to take the field. The army, soon after our arrival, had, in consequence of a _secret memorandum_[5] issued by the duke of Wellington to the chief officers in command, drawn closer together, in the probable expectation of an attack, and our great antagonist was not the sort of man to send us word of the when and the where. Louis XVIII, with his suite and a train of followers, being with us at Ghent, we were not destitute of information. Napoleon was as well informed of all that transpired in Belgium as if it had taken place at the Tuileries. Things continued in this state until June, when, from various rumours, we began to be more on the alert. At the commencement of operations, the duke of Wellington’s army comprised about 105,000 men, including the troops in garrison, and composed of about 35,000 British, 6,000 King’s German legion, 24,000 Hanoverians, 7,000 Brunswickers, and 32,000 Dutch-Belgians and Nassau-men, with a hundred and ninety-six guns. Many in the ranks of the last-named troops had served under Napoleon, and there still prevailed amongst them a most powerful prejudice in his favour; it was natural, therefore, that we should not place too strong a reliance upon them, whenever they might become opposed to their old companions in arms.