... “We have as yet done nothing here.... Towards the 16th, I hope we shall begin. I shall enter France with between seventy and eighty thousand men; the Prussians near me, with twice as many[95].” This document was penned a fortnight before the action at Quatre-Bras, where we began work in earnest, as the Duke had anticipated, exactly on the 16th. This fact, of itself, should suffice to stop the mouths of those who delight in telling us that Wellington was taken by surprise. There were moments indeed, when he thought that Napoleon’s ambition might be so far controlled by common prudence, as to be content with remaining within the boundaries of France, and leaving the odium of acting aggressively to the allied powers; and in such moments, the Duke spoke and wrote of awaiting for the combined movements of the Austrians and Russians. But not for a single instant did he lose sight of the possibility, nay probability, that Bonaparte would rush across the borders, begin offensive operations, and make a dash to seize the person of Louis XVIII, or to get possession of the city of Brussels. Against these contingencies, how early and how ably our great chieftain provided, let facts, and not the dreams of mortified narrators, inform the world. On the 6th, 7th, and 10th of June, the Duke dispatched letters to the Prussians’ head-quarters], informing them that the enemy was in great strength about Maubeuge, where Bonaparte was said to be on the 9th, and thence to have gone along the frontiers towards Lille; and that an attack was to be forthwith expected[96]. With this intelligence received by Wellington, and actively circulated by him among all who were exposed to be attacked by the French, how was it possible that he should be taken by _surprise_? Every movement of the enemy was quickly known to him; and his characteristic vigilance, and matured judgment, enabled him to foretell the very time and place of the grand attack. All that depended on him was in perfect readiness, several days before fighting began. If the Prussians were unaccountably remiss in not forwarding to his Grace earlier intelligence of the descent of the enemy into Belgium, it was not for want of watchfulness on the part of the Duke; _he_ was quite awake. Let the reader turn to the Appendix of this work, (No. I,) for proof that Wellington was not easily to be surprised, but that he had all his forces so well in hand on the 30th of April, that they could march at a moment’s notice, and unite at any point really attacked.