order, and we have no fear of consequences in so good and holy an enterprise,” &c. &c. We have abridged this dialogue, and profess no more than to give the substance of it. And when we compare it with all we have seen, heard, and read on the side of Abolition, and with the ordinary features of the movement, we see not but it is a fair representation. Any persons, however, are at liberty to qualify it, as they may think it deserves. There are, doubtless, Abolitionists of all shades and degrees; but there is a common ground, on which those who constitute the strength of the movement, meet. We suppose it ought to be allowed, that most of them _profess_ respect for the authority of law on this point, and that they intend nothing but Constitutional modes of reformation. The Constitution of their great Society, proposes “to do all that is _lawfully_ in our power to bring about the extinction of slavery.” But every one construes the law for himself; and generally, that is lawful, which sets up the right of the slave to his freedom, as paramount to the law of the land. That we do no injustice to Abolitionists by these statements, is open to proof, by the high authority of the last Annual Report of their Parent Society, in which, however startling it may seem, they have not only in effect, _but in form_, set aside the authority of the Federal Constitution, in regard to slavery, by _construction_! After quoting the well known third clause of the second Section of the Fourth Article, which recognizes the validity of property in slaves, and provides to defend it, having first stated, that, “if strictly construed it could not apply to slaves,” because it does not _name_ them _as slaves_, the Report goes on to say: “It is obvious to remark, in the first place, that the _intentions_ of the framers--_whatever by historical evidence we may ascertain them to have been_--_cannot bind_ us to an interpretation of the Constitution which its own language does not render necessary, and which is inconsistent with objects for which it was professedly framed, to wit, ‘to establish justice,’ and ‘to secure the blessings of liberty.’ _But we go further_: We contend, that when the Constitution was framed, it was the understanding of _all parties_, that slavery was soon to be abolished by the States, and the clause intended to facilitate the recovery of fugitive slaves was a mere _temporary_ concession, to _expire_ with the unhallowed anomaly which called for it. If such be the case, it need hardly be said, that the slave States, after having _violated_, on their part, that good faith which was implied in the compact, _have no right_ to urge its fulfilment, beyond the letter, on the other part.” “Beyond the letter.” “The _letter_” does not happen to _name_ slaves.