Mr. BUTLER said that, if there was a numerous portion of those who were already citizens of the United States who can never aspire to, nor be eligible for, those situations under the constitution, he did not see how this supposed alternative could be upheld. The people of Louisiana, under the treaty and under the constitution, will clearly come under the description of naturalized citizens. While he was up, he would take the opportunity of speaking to the question at large, and to examine the motives which produced this amendment; the principal cause of solicitude, on this subject, he understood to be the base intrigues which were said to have been carried on at the Presidential election. Mr. WRIGHT called to order; and a short altercation on the point of order took place. Mr. BUTLER proceeded. He had on a former day asked if he might, in this stage of the discussion, take a view of the whole subject; the House had decided in the affirmative. When the proposition was first laid before the House, he had felt a disposition in favor of it; his mind had been shocked by those base intrigues, which had taken place at the late Presidential election, and he was hurried by indignation into a temper which a little cool reflection and some observation on a particular mode of action in that House, had checked and corrected, and finally convinced him that much caution was required in a proceeding of that nature, and that, in all human probability, such a scene of intrigue may never occur again; that it became questionable whether any steps whatever were necessary. Upon a careful review of the subject, it appeared to him that an alteration might make matters worse; for though at present there has been afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice of the Chief Magistrate made from among its citizens. The jealousy of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime, and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice