Accepting the universe : $b Essays in naturalismBurroughs, John
Philosophy
Accepting the universe : $b Essays in naturalism
Burroughs, John
Natural history; Natural history -- Philosophy; Philosophy; Science
Eckermann reports Goethe as saying to him that “Nature’s intentions
are always good”; but if questioned, Goethe would hardly have
maintained that the clouds, the winds, the streams, the tides,
gravity, cohesion, and so on, have intentions of any sort, much less
intentions directed to us or away from us. Even the wisest among
us thus make man the aim and object of Nature. We impose our own
psychology upon the very rock and trees.
Goethe always read into Nature his own human traits; always when he
speaks of her he speaks as an artist and poet. He says to Eckermann
that Nature “is always true, always serious, always severe; she is
always right, and the errors and faults are always those of man. The
man who is incapable of appreciating her, she despises; and only to
the apt, the pure, the true, does she resign herself and reveal her
secrets. The understanding will not reach her; man must be capable
of elevating himself to the highest Reason to come into that contact
with the Divinity which manifests in the primitive phenomena which
dwell behind them and from which they proceed. The divinity works
in the living, not in the dead; in the becoming and changing, not
in the become and the fixed. Therefore, reason, with its tendency
toward the divine, has only to do with the becoming, the living; but
understanding has to do with the become, the already fixed, that
it may make use of it.” In this last we see the germ of Bergson’s
philosophy. The divinity that dwells behind phenomena, and from which
they proceed, is the attempt of the human mind to find the end of
that which has no end, the law of causation.
III
EACH FOR ITS OWN SAKE
“Proud man exclaims, ‘See all things for my use!’
‘See all for mine,’ replies the pampered goose.”
And the pampered goose was right: all things are just as much for her
use as for man’s, while there are reasonable doubts whether things
were created for the especial use of either.
Man, like the goose, appropriates what suits him, but is slow to
realize the fact that what suits him, or is fitted to his use,
depends upon his own powers of adaptation. We can say that he suits
it, rather than that it suits him. He has lungs because there is air,
and eyes because there are certain vibrations in the ether. In short,
nature is the primary fact, and the forms and organs of life the
secondary fact.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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