After the stock market crash of November, 1929 : $b A supplementary chapter to the psychology of speculation issued in 1926 — John Shaqi
After the stock market crash of November, 1929 : $b A supplementary chapter to the psychology of speculation issued in 1926Harper, Henry Howard
General
After the stock market crash of November, 1929 : $b A supplementary chapter to the psychology of speculation issued in 1926
Harper, Henry Howard
Depressions -- 1929; Speculation; Stock exchanges
The theory advanced by some of the economists that the trading public
merely lost their paper profits, and practically nothing else was
either gained or lost in the tremendous rise and fall of stocks,
is a little misleading. One authority says: “For the shrinkage of
thirty-five or forty billions of dollars in stock exchange securities
nobody is any poorer but on account of things possessed and consumed
too soon.” Assuming that the market started at a given point in 1924
and reacted to that point in 1929, it would mean a loss of many
hundreds of millions in commissions and interest. It is estimated that
in 1929 alone the commissions for transactions on the two “Big Boards”
amounted to well upward of five hundred million dollars. Most of the
margin traders lost all of their original investment, and many of them
all they could borrow on their notes, their life insurance policies,
and even their homes.
All this by way of retrospect. The vital question that confronts us
is: will traders and investors profit by the experience? Apparently
not. The survivors of the late catastrophe promptly formed a “wrecking
crew,” and are at the present moment busily engaged in rebuilding the
market structure on pretty much the same lines as before. The rumor
band has been reorganized and is piping its old-time music into the
ears of all listeners. The tipsters are also lined up, and with the
cheery cry that the storm is all over they are wheedling and coaxing
the public to come out of the storm cellars and get aboard the
reconstruction train. They harp persistently on the fact that stocks
are cheap,--not because of their dividend return, but because they
are selling much below the boom prices. Their calculations are drawn
mostly from figures at the big end of the measuring tape. Improved
business--which exists more in the imagination than in fact--is
employed as a smoke screen to hide the fact that the great majority of
the active stocks are still selling far above a reasonable investment
basis. At their present prices ten of the best known representative
common stocks,--U. S. Steel, General Electric, Westinghouse Electric,
Atchison, American Tobacco, Radio, Consolidated Gas, American & Foreign
Power, Columbia Gas and Johns-Manville, pay an average return of two
and nine-tenths per cent. In other words, at going prices if you bought
one share each of these ten stocks the total cost would be $1425 on
which you would receive an annual dividend of $41.60, or less than the
return on U. S. Government bonds. It is therefore clear that a bull
market constructed on this basis must be a highly speculative affair.
In February, 1930, the financial editor of the New York Herald Tribune
printed the following comment:--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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