The classical economists, the people of _laissez faire_ persuasion, accept this condition as natural, as inevitable, and therefore desirable. But is it desirable? The sharp price rise which comes as a shortage becomes apparent benefits those lucky producers who have supplies on hand, and especially those keen speculators who first saw the oncoming shortage and bought in anticipation. This sharp price rise may overstimulate production. The high hog prices in 1909–1910 stimulated the production of too many hogs, and when this increased production reached market, the price was $6.50 instead of the expected $8 to $10. And the low prices of 1911–1912 in turn begat the high prices of 1913–1914. The question comes, Would it not be to the public interest if, in price making, more emphasis could be placed on cost of production and less on the short-time working of the law of supply and demand? Prices should rise with a short crop, but not to such an extent as to make a short crop more profitable than a normal crop. If a moderate rise in prices will not sufficiently curtail demand, then the public should be educated to the fact that there has been a drouth, and that unless they curtail their demand, there will not be enough to go around. Of course, under our present _laissez faire_ attitude, every speculative business man would take such a pronouncement as a “bull” statement, and the demand would immediately increase instead of decrease. There is danger that any attempt to make cost of production the guiding factor in price determination will amount to close government supervision of storage, speculation and similar market phenomena. The disadvantages of government supervision are apparent to all who watched the Food Administration at work during the war. The Food Administration performed a hard job remarkably well, but farmers found that the officials were ignorant of agriculture, and that, moreover, agricultural interests could not expect a square deal except in so far as they were organized to compel a square deal, or except as the emergency itself compelled a square deal to insure continued production. If farmers are to continue under the present _laissez faire_ system with supply and demand, together with strategic manipulations, as the price-making force, they must necessarily learn to play the game themselves. They will find it necessary to practice sabotage in the same scientific, businesslike way as labor and capital. They will reduce the size of their crops at strategic moments, because they know that small crops ordinarily bring in a greater return than large crops. Of course, if farmers should practice sabotage in the same heartless, efficient way as labor and capital, our society will be imperiled. The burden of the sabotage practiced by labor and capital has been borne chiefly by the farmer. When farmers also practice sabotage, labor and capital will be forced to come to an agreement with farmers on production and price matters.