No word of complaint; no murmuring; but with the expressed knowledge that he was to be attacked, when attack meant defeat, he calmly announced his determination to hold his ground as “long as possible.” CONFEDERATE MILITARY MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE. From their camp at Moody’s Spring, where they had arrived Monday night, Generals Price and McCulloch moved forward to the point on Wilson’s creek, heretofore described, and went again into camp on the 6th. Scouting parties were at once sent out, especially to discover the Federal position, but with little success, while foraging parties scoured the country in every direction, and were equally inefficient in obtaining information. The combined forces were at once put in position to advance on Springfield, and only awaited the decision of Gen. McCulloch to begin to move. The latter was irresolute and undecided for some days. From the information he possessed as to the strength and character of Lyon’s forces and his knowledge of his own, he was fearful of the result of an engagement at that time. He had but little confidence in Price’s Missourians, who were somewhat undisciplined and inexperienced, it is true, and at one time he characterized them as “splendid roasting-ear foragers, but poor soldiers.” It is an undoubted fact that at one time Gen. McCulloch had decided _to retreat into Arkansas_. Gen. Price, however, was anxious for an immediate advance and attack. He knew that Lyon’s force was inferior even to his own, and that the entire Southern army had but little to risk in offering battle. He knew furthermore, that Lyon ought to be reinforced, and that the chances were that he could and would be, and of course it was desirable that the enemy be attacked before this reinforcement should be effected. The most serious feature considered by McCulloch, that the Missourians were illy disciplined, imperfectly organized, and poorly armed, Price thought would be overcome by their superiority in numbers and _their pluck_ in fighting on Missouri soil against a detested enemy—“the Yankee Dutch.” There remains to be shown a good reason why McCulloch did not follow up Lyon and attack him on the 6th; it is true that he gained a victory by waiting, but that victory could have been won four days earlier and made more complete, more decisive and more lasting in its results. And yet McCulloch, on the 8th, seriously meditated a retreat—knowing his enemy’s strength as well as his own, and understanding, or supposed to understand, the situation perfectly.