Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources and assignment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability occurrence. When it is in competition with pressing social needs for a portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness. History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that assignment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed by leadership and regular oversight over the allocation of financial resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function. The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among different jurisdictions and levels of government. Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of other levels of government and then fails to follow through with implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_ with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program initiatives and not meet their requirements. CHAPTER V AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL IMPACTS Often, it is assumed that disasters leave masses of the population in the impacted areas dazed and helpless and unable to cope with the new conditions, or that those not so immobilized panic or display antisocial behavior. Another common assumption is that local communities and organizations are rendered ineffective to handle the many problems, leading to further disorganization, loss of morale, and requiring the quick assertion of "strong" outside leadership and control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. The widespread sharing of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an intimate cooperativeness among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a channel for very close communication and expression and a major source of physical and emotional support and reassurance. This capacity seems to account for the resiliency of personality and social organization in dealing with threat and danger. It is also at the base of the ability of social life to regenerate.