An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
13. According to their condition.
We may, I think, from the make of an oyster or cockle, reasonably
conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick senses as a man, or
several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and
incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be
bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature
that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it
perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an
inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once
placed it, and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or
foul water, as it happens to come to it?
14. Decay of perception in old age.
But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception, whereby
they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be
so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one in whom
decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and
clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and has,
by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a
great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter;
or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made
are scarcely perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one
(notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his
knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or
an oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty
years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three
days, I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual
perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.
15. Perception the Inlet of all materials of Knowledge.
Perception then being the FIRST step and degree towards knowledge, and
the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well
as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions
are that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are that are
employed about them,—the more remote are they from that knowledge which
is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees
(as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the
several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals.
It suffices me only to have remarked here,—that perception is the first
operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all
knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is
perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries
between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention
only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in
hand which way the learned shall determine of it.
CHAPTER X.
OF RETENTION.
1. Contemplation
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