An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few
superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from
without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself
within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal
constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties
to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves
knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we
experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and
separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies;
we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial
spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as
well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking
should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a
contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from
thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from
another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of
solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing
without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without
thinking, i.e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to
conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter
should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas
we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature
of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness
and difficulties, and can discover nothing further but our own
blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be
clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the
simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received
from sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas of
substances, even of God himself.
33. Our complex idea of God.
For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme
Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way; and that the
complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made of
the simple ideas we receive from reflection; v.g. having, from what we
experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of
knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other
qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without;
when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme
Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so
putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind
has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from
sensation and reflection, has been already shown.
34. Our complex idea of God as infinite.
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