An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of AssentNewman, John Henry
Religion
An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent
Newman, John Henry
Faith; Theism
It appears then, that, in assenting to propositions, an apprehension
in some sense of their terms is not only necessary to assent, as such,
but also gives a distinct character to its acts. If therefore we would
know more about Assent, we must know more about the apprehension which
accompanies it. Accordingly to the subject of Apprehension I proceed.
Chapter III. The Apprehension Of Propositions.
I said in my Introductory Chapter that there can be no assent to a
proposition, without some sort of apprehension of its terms; next that
there are two modes of apprehension, notional and real; thirdly, that,
while assent may be given to a proposition on either apprehension of
it, still its acts are elicited more heartily and forcibly, when they
are made upon real apprehension which has things for its objects,
than when they are made in favour of notions and with a notional
apprehension. The first of these three points I have just been
discussing; now I will proceed to the second, viz. the two modes of
apprehending propositions, leaving the third for the Chapters which
follow.
I have used the word _apprehension_, and not _understanding_,
because the latter word is of uncertain meaning, standing sometimes
for the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition, sometimes for
that of comprehending it, neither of which come into the sense of
_apprehension_. It is possible to apprehend without understanding.
I apprehend what is meant by saying that John is Richard’s wife’s
father’s aunt’s husband, but, if I am unable so to take in these
successive relationships as to understand the upshot of the whole,
viz. that John is great-uncle-in-law to Richard, I cannot be said to
understand the proposition. In like manner, I may take a just view
of a man’s conduct, and therefore apprehend it, and yet may profess
that I cannot understand it; that is, I have not the key to it, and
do not see its consistency in detail: I have no just conception of
it. Apprehension then is simply an intelligent acceptance of the idea
or of the fact which a proposition enunciates. “Pride will have a
fall;” “Napoleon died at St. Helena;” I have no difficulty in entering
into the sentiment contained in the former of these, or into the fact
declared in the latter; that is, I apprehend them both.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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