elaborate replies to it may be sufficiently refuted by raising the cry of "misconstruction;" let them, I say, take some little pains to understand the work for themselves, instead of merely giving echo to the blunders of the younger Edwards. President Edwards says, that the term cause is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify that which has "a _positive efficiency_ or _influence_ to _produce_ a thing, or bring it to pass." It is in this restrained sense that I use the word, when I say that President Edwards regarded motive as the cause of volition; and it is in this sense that I intend to make the charge good. I intend to show that he regarded motive, not merely as the occasion or condition of volition, but as that which _produces_ it. This position, as we have seen, has been denied by high authority; and therefore it becomes necessary to establish it, in order that I may not be charged with disputing only about words; and that although I may be exceedingly "desirous of being thought to differ with President Edwards" on this subject, yet I do "most exactly agree with him." To begin then;--if motive is merely the condition on which the mind acts, and exerts no influence in the production of volition, it is certainly improper to say, that it _gives rise to volition_. This clearly implies that it is the efficient, or producing cause of volition. On this point, let the younger Edwards himself be the judge. "That self-determination _gives rise_ to volition," is an expression which he quotes from Dr. Chauncey, and italicizes the words "gives rise to," as showing that the author of them regarded the mind as the efficient cause of volition. Now, President Edwards says, that the "strongest motive excites the mind to volition;" and he adds, that "the notion of exciting, is _exerting influence to cause the effect to arise and come forth into existence_," p. 96. Surely, if to give rise to a thing, is efficiently to cause it, no less can be said of exerting influence "to _cause it to arise and come forth into existence_." And if so, then, according to the younger Edwards himself, the author of the Inquiry regarded motive as the efficient cause of volition; and yet, on p. 66 he declares, that President Edwards did not hold "motive to be the efficient cause of volition;" and that if he has dropped any expression which implies such a doctrine, it must have been an inadvertency. I intend to show, before I have done, that there are many such inadvertencies in his work; the younger Edwards himself being the judge.