Now, it will not be denied, that that which produces a thing, is its efficient cause. The younger Edwards himself has spoken of an "_efficient, producing_ cause," in such a manner as to show that he regarded them as convertible terms, p. 46. He being judge, then, that which produces a thing, is its efficient cause. I might easily show, if it were necessary, that he himself frequently speaks of motive as the efficient, or producing cause of volition; but, at present, I am only concerned with the doctrine of President Edwards. "It is true," says President Edwards, "I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can see the effectual power of any cause to _produce_ them, for the power and _efficacy_ of the cause is not seen but by the effect," p. 277. Here, from the volition, from the effect, he infers the operation of the cause or power which _produces_ it. Now this cause is motive, the strongest motive; for this is that which operates to induce a choice. Motive, then, _produces_ volition, according to the Inquiry; it is not merely the condition on which it is produced. The younger Edwards declares, that President Edwards did not regard "motive as the efficient cause of volition," p. 66, but only as the "occasion or previous circumstances necessary to volition;" in this respect "most exactly agreeing with Dr. West" himself; and yet he tells us, in another place, that "every cause of volition is included in President Edwards' definition of motive," p. 104. Now, does not every cause of volition include the efficient cause thereof? Does not this expression include that which is the cause of volition in the real, in the only proper, sense of the word?