“But what when the memory itself loses anything, as falls out when we forget and seek that we may recollect? Where, in the end, do we search, but in the memory itself? And there, if one thing be, perchance, offered instead of another, we reject it, until what we seek meets us; and when it doth we say ‘This is it’; which we should not unless we recognized it, nor recognize it, unless we remembered it——For we do not believe it as something new, but upon recollection, allow what was named to be right. But were it utterly blotted out of the mind, we should not remember it, even when reminded. For we have not as yet utterly forgotten that which we remember ourselves to have forgotten. What, then, we have utterly forgotten, though lost, we cannot even seek after.”[38] It would not be difficult to find passages in modern psychologies that read almost like translations of this chapter of Augustine’s Confessions. Two kinds of memory—sense memory and intellectual memory are distinguished in the Augustinian psychology. The former preserves and reproduces not only the images of visible objects, but also the impressions of sounds, odors and other objects which strike our senses.[39] The images are not like the _eidola_ of Democritus, but are ideal, formed by the mind from its own essence. Intellectual memory contains our knowledge of the sciences, of literature, and dialectic, and of the questions relating to these subjects.[40] This memory, unlike the memory of sense, contains not the images of things, but the things themselves. These ideas which the intellectual memory stores up are in a sense innate. They never came to us through the senses. They could never have been taught to us, unless we had already had them in our memories. “When I learned them I gave not credit to another man’s mind, but recognized them in mine.” Thus the memory contains the idea of truth and of God. Augustine points out, too, what has been repeated by Locke and others until it has become a platitude, that we do not remember objects themselves, but the ideas which we have gained from them. And with his usual subtlety he shows that much of what is ordinarily attributed to perception is really the work of memory.