An Historical Sketch of the Conceptions of Memory among the AncientsBurnham, William Henry
Philosophy
An Historical Sketch of the Conceptions of Memory among the Ancients
Burnham, William Henry
Memory (Philosophy) -- History; Thesis (Ph. D.)
“We see what importance St. Augustine attaches to memory. It is in his
view the faculty which preserves the ideas relating @not@ only
to the body, but to the soul, not only to eternal truths, but to the
Eternal Being himself——. This memory, which is peculiar to man, and
which animals do not possess—this memory, which in a mysterious manner
contains in it intelligible realities, is, according to the Bishop of
Hippo, one of the three great faculties of man, and the origin of the
other two. It is from it that intelligence arises, and the will proceeds
from the one to the other and unites them. Thus, if it is allowed to
compare things human with things divine, we have in us an image of the
august Trinity. Memory, in which is the matter of knowledge, and which
is as the place of intelligible things, offers some resemblance to the
Father; the intellect, which is derived ¬from¬ and formed from
it, is not without analogy to the Son; and love or will, which unites
the intelligible (or memory) to the intellect has a certain resemblance
to the Holy Spirit.”[41] The phenomena of memory were also important
with Augustine as weapons against materialism. By memory the soul knows
objects of sense when it no longer perceives them, and, moreover,
combines the heterogeneous in ways inexplicable by means of a
phys¬ch¬ical substance. And again the soul can form abstract
conceptions of space and mathematical truths.
The well-known conditions of a good memory, such as acuteness of
sensation, order, and repetition, Augustine notices only incidentally.
More attention is given to the relation of the will to memory and to the
association of ideas.
Whether we remember or not depends upon the will. By an act of will we
avert the memory from sense-perceptions, as, for example, when we hear a
speaker and do not notice what he says, or read a page and do not know
what we have read, or walk with our attention upon something else. In
all these cases we perceive, but do not remember our perceptions. So,
too, recollection depends upon the will: “As the will applies the @sense
to the@ body (or external object), so it applies the memory to the
sense, and the eye of the mind of the thinker to the memory.”[42]
This power of the will over memory is, however, limited by the
association of ideas. In order to recall anything by a voluntary effort
we must remember the general notion of the thing or some associated
idea. “For example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday,
either I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at
least, I have remembered something about that time itself, if nothing
else; at all events, I have remembered yesterday and that part of
yesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is.”[43] In
another place he says that, of a series of ideas the lost part is
recovered “by the part whereof we had hold.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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