I have sometimes entred so heartily into the spirit of the statesman, that I have been apt to forget my situation in the society in which I live; and when the private man reads over the politician, his natural partiality in favour of individuals, leads him to condemn, as Machiavellian principles, every sentiment approving the sacrifice of private concerns, in favour of a general plan. In order, therefore, to reconcile me to myself in this particular, and to prevent certain expressions, here and there interspersed, from making the slightest impression upon a reader of delicate sentiments, I must observe, that nothing would have been so easy as to soften many passages, where the politician appears to have snatched the pen out of the hand of the private citizen: but as I write for such only who can follow a close reasoning, and attend to the general scope of the whole inquiry, I have, purposely, made no correction; but continued painting in the strongest colours, every inconvenience which must affect certain individuals living under our free modern governments, whenever a wise statesman sets about correcting old abuses, proceeding from idleness, sloth or fraud in the lower classes, arbitrary jurisdictions in the higher, and neglects in administrations, with respect to the interests of both. The more any cure is painful and dangerous, the more ought men to be careful in avoiding the disease. This leads me to say a word concerning the connection between the theory of morals and that of politics. I lay it down as a general maxim, that the characteristic of a good action consists in the conformity between the motive, and the duty of the agent. If there were but one man upon earth, his duty would contain no other precepts than those dictated by self-love. If he comes to be a father, a husband, a friend, his self-love falls immediately under limitations: he must withhold from himself, and give to his children; he must know how to sacrifice some of his fancies, in order to gratify, now and then, those of his wife, or of his friend. If he comes to be a judge, a magistrate, he must frequently forget that he is a friend, or a father: and if he rises to be a statesman, he must disregard many other attachments more comprehensive, such as family, place of birth, and even, in certain cases, his native country. His duty here becomes relative to the general good of that society of which he is the head: and as the death of a criminal cannot be imputed to the judge who condemns him, neither can a particular inconvenience resulting to an individual, in consequence of a step taken for a general reformation, be imputed to him who sits at the helm of government.