I now pass to the second part of this operation, to wit, the influence which the imposition of coinage has upon the interests of trade, when the question is to purchase the commodities of other countries. These operations are quite different, and in examining this theory they must be carefully distinguished. [Sidenote: When the balance is favourable.] We have seen how the imposition of coinage, during the favourable balance of trade, procures to the nation an advanced price upon the sale of her exports. As long as it remains favourable, it must produce the same good effect with regard to her importations, by sinking at home the price of the bullion with which she must pay for them. Bullion must become cheap in the English market, in proportion as the balance of her trade is favourable, and in proportion as it is cheaper there than in other nations (with respect to their respective coins) in the same proportion, the nation has an advantage in paying what she buys, or in employing her bullion for extending the fund of her own commerce. [Sidenote: And how, when unfavourable.] Upon the other hand, should the balance of her trade turn against her, her bullion rises. This renders the price of all foreign merchandize dearer to the importers than otherwise they would be; because they must pay them in bullion. But this loss is at present constantly incurred; and when incurred, is not _national_, the national loss is upon the balance of the trade; but whether this balance be paid in bullion at the mint price, or in bullion at the price of coin, the balance of the trade is just the same. Now, if this wrong balance (which I here suppose to proceed only from the imports exceeding the exports upon trade in general) renders the purchase of foreign commodities dearer to the merchants, without costing more to the nation; is not this so far advantageous, that it discourages importations, just at the time they ought to be discouraged, and thereby may _tend_ to set the balance even again? Thus I have endeavoured to analize the influence of this principle in the four cases; to wit, upon exportation and importation, under a favourable and unfavourable balance of trade. These different combinations must always be examined separately, or else obscurity and confusion will ensue. We must also observe, that there are still other combinations to be attended to, although it be superfluous to apply the principles to them; because the variations proceeding from them are self-evident. I mean, that this question may be considered as relative to a nation which has coinage free, with respect to another nation where that duty is imposed. In this case we may decide, that as far as the situation of the latter is advantageous, so far must that of the former be disadvantageous, and _vice versa_.