in the coalescent conscious situation: the sight of a nice piece of egg being one situation, that of a nasty caterpillar another, each associated with its specific behaviour-consciousness. We need not carry the illustration further on these lines: the essential feature is that experience grows by the coalescence of successive increments, and that each increment modifies the situation which takes effect on the _succeeding_ phases of behaviour, even if they succeed within the fraction of a second. That is what is meant by saying that present experience is for future guidance. The future need not be remote, but may be so immediate that in popular speech we may say that it is not future but present guidance which is rendered possible. We may now turn for a moment to the criticism that there are numberless cases in which nothing of the nature of distinct memory is involved. We may now substitute for the word remembrance, which was used above, the more technical term _re-presentation_. Profiting by experience, regarded as a criterion of the presence of effective consciousness, involves re-presentative elements in the conscious situation which carry with them meaning. Let us for the moment assume an ultra-sceptical attitude with regard to any conscious accompaniment. The chick when it pecks, let us say, is an unconscious automaton. It seizes a piece of egg; this affords an unconscious stimulus, which sets agoing unconscious acts of swallowing; or it seizes a piece of meal soaked in quinine, which sets agoing unconscious acts of rejection and touches the hidden springs which make the automaton wipe its bill. So far we find no great difficulty. It is when we have to consider subsequent behaviour that a severe strain is felt on this method of interpretation. One can understand an automatic action repeated again and again as often as the stimulus is repeated. But the chick may shake its head and wipe its bill on the mere sight of the quinine-soaked meal, which, on the hypothesis of conscious experience, has already proved distasteful. So that if we accept the unconscious automaton theory we must assume an organic association which closely simulates the conscious association to which our own experience testifies. But the associations which take part in the guidance of behaviour in the chick are so varied and delicate, so closely resemble those which in ourselves imply conscious guidance, that a sceptical attitude throws more strain upon our credulity than the acceptance of the current belief in conscious control. We shall therefore assume that evidence for such coalescent association is also evidence of the presence of effective consciousness.