3d. The best way of procuring correct information is the next condition. Falsified returns are not impossible. If any office should be failing in its endeavours to keep its business together, having men at its head whose names are unknown save in a petty and obscure locality, a strong check is necessary; and it seems scarcely practicable to avoid the appointment of a competent person as an arbiter of their correctness. Unpopular as this might be at first, were the appointment placed in proper hands and judiciously carried out, it would be of immense benefit. It would indeed be scarcely necessary for the inspector to be a government officer. The established companies might fairly say, that they have done no wrong, and that a close espial by a government agent would be derogatory. But were an inspector of this kind chosen unitedly by the offices, and paid by the State, the companies having no voice in his dismissal, excepting under circumstances which ought to command it, there would be less objection. The necessity for such an officer would arise from the brevity of the accounts to be published. It would be his duty to see that the data from which they were formed was true; that the premiums received were as large as was stated; and that while the investments were as great, the liabilities were not greater than the report asserted. The power to examine and compare these returns with the books of the various companies is a delicate consideration; but as the offices might appoint the inspector themselves, it would, after all, be only an additional check by their own officer on their own affairs. The mode of investing need not be published, as the power of the inspector to demand an examination would be a sufficient check on immorally-disposed offices. Nor is such a case unprecedented, as by a clause in the Bank Charter Act of 1844, commissioners are empowered to search into and examine the books of those bankers who issue notes.[30]