The administration of justice in this country is to some extent idealised by the world at large. Certainly, there is honesty of purpose in the word and act of every English judge. But where the law is wrong the most painstaking and conscientious judge can hardly be right. Then, again, for example, where a judge is compelled to combine three distinct and separate jurisdictions in one, as in Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty, the machinery of justice must sometimes tend to clog. It is also utterly incongruous for the same judge to be expected to perfect himself in three subjects so widely different in character. What, for instance, could be further removed from the troubles of a man and his wife than the navigation of ships on the high sea? Probably a liability to collision is the only point in common! Probate is less remote in one sense and equally so in another. It is almost grossly anomalous to run these three branches of law and legal training in the same division, presided over by the same judges. Probate should be shifted to the Chancery Division, Admiralty to the King’s Bench, and Divorce might be allowed a little court of its own. Before 1858 matrimonial causes were in the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts, which by the grace of God and the law of the land are now almost limited to the punishment of ecclesiastical black sheep--a sufficient occupation, perhaps, in itself! Actual divorce, by the way, was only possible in those days by means of a Private Act of Parliament. (This method still applies in Ireland.)