But to come to the law as it now stands, it seems to contain at least two great imperfections, namely, the judicial separation and the dreadful tie between an erring husband and an erring wife. In cases of the latter description, the practice is to prevent the parties to the predicament from mending their ways or improving their hope of happiness, whatever form that hope may take. It also frequently leads to the misfortunes of a third person, who might otherwise escape on a conscionable arrangement. _A_ is the husband of _B_. _A_ commits adultery and his wife does likewise. They then discover their common shortcomings, with the consequence that they forthwith become violently opposed to one another and separate. What is the net result? They are tied together for life; _B_ soon becomes desperate; presently, she encourages many lovers and her last vestige of self-respect disappears. Henceforth, she is a _déclassée_. _A_, on the other hand, ultimately settles his affection on one woman, otherwise blameless in character. He cannot marry her and she drifts into concubinage. Had some means existed to bring the unfortunate marriage of _A_ and _B_ to an end at the time of their original delinquencies, all of these later developments might have been, almost certainly would have been, avoided. The usual inability, therefore, for an erring husband and an erring wife to legally dissolve their union, sows the seed of increasing injustice, which may, and probably does, extend to the punishment of persons who were not parties to the primary condition of adultery. A divorce should be obtainable, as of course, on the application of either party to a marriage, after one year’s domiciliary separation, whether such separation is due to mutual transgression, or merely to the lesser evils of married life. Under such a condition of affairs, the community would be bound to benefit.