He said, he was yet to learn what plan Administration could pretend to alledge they had followed, or meant to follow, in America. Upon what grounds could they attempt to prosecute an _offensive_ war? Or, taking the alternative, how can they presume to say they have acted on the _defensive_?⸺As to the first, they have thirty thousand men to conquer the continent of America: admitting then the superiority of their army and their navy, still he contended that superiority had been, and ever must be ineffectual and useless; because, as long as the English army and navy co-operate, the Americans will never have the unnecessary temerity to give up the advantage of situation, or expose their cause to the hazard of one decisive engagement. The last campaign was the clearest proof of that position; and, now, though our fleet was superior to the French, yet D’Estaign is safe at Boston.—It was, on that principle, he doubted not, the gallant and experienced Commanders of the last campaign had formed their conduct: It was their policy, and, in his opinion, the best policy, to keep a collected force, and to avoid any inferior exertions, that might require a separation, or weaken that superiority, which, in case of a decisive action, they rightly judged could alone have been fatal to American resistance.—It remained for General Clinton to pursue a contrary policy.—Yet, though (he declared) no man in that house entertained a higher respect for the personal and professional merit of that able Commander, (who from his particular talent for military enterprise, and his education under the Prince of Brunswick, was best calculated for effecting such a plan) yet, from the minutest investigation of the late Gazettes, he could not collect any very auspicious presage of his military career. If indeed, from his observation, of what had already happened, he might hazard an opinion of what may happen, we had no reason to rejoice at the revival of that plan of separation, which had proved so fatal in the Northern expedition. He was sorry he had mentioned that expedition—It led him to a subject he wished to avoid.—He had been accused of an asperity of reflexion on the conduct of the noble Lord who planned that expedition. He would strive, in future, to overcome his indignation, by indulging his contempt for the Adviser of it.—Yet, thus much he would say; though unhappy for this country, it was happy for our troops, happy for our officers, to be directed and controlled by a Minister, to whose wisdom not even Envy could ascribe one particle of their success, in whose imbecillity even Justice would afford them an asylum from every disgrace.