Having thus stated the impracticability of an offensive war in America, either on the former plan of united force, or on the present separate efforts, he recurred to the other part of his argument, whether Administration could pretend to alledge their having adopted the alternative, and formed even a defensive plan for America and the West-Indies?⸺If they dared to assume that merit, how could they expect the House to attend, with any degree of patience, to such a mockery of all truth? On any rational plan of mere defence, would they not have left a force at New-York, Rhode-Island, and Halifax, fully able to prevent any attack in that quarter; at the same time, detaching a sufficient force to protect the West-India Islands?—Upon such a plan, would not any spirited Minister have grafted some degree of activity and enterprise? Would He not have attacked Martinique, Guadaloupe, or St. Domingo? Such conduct would have struck terror to France, we should have been enriched by new acquisitions, or, at least, have prevented the disgrace of our own losses. But, admitting that this defensive plan may have been but recently adopted, how are Administration to regain the time they have lost, or what resources of finance are still unexhausted to prosecute even this plan? Are all the Country Gentlemen equally disposed to devote fifteen shillings in the pound to carry on this defensive war? Are they all equally delighted with the great and growing ruin of an accumulating debt and a decreasing revenue? Or do they rest their hopes on the wealth of our East-India trade? Do they know that, there too, the French are undermining the foundation of our commerce? Or is it studiously concealed from them, that the French ministry have sent Monsieur Vaugelin to Canton, in the quality of their Consul at the Chinese Court?⸺He had heard much of a sudden increase of national wealth by our late captures, but, at best, the prizes of privateers are a partial benefit; they can enrich but a few individuals; they afford no diminution of the general burthens of a whole people. In the present instance, the truth was these boasted prizes were, in fact, public losses; the French having had the art to insure their most valuable ships, particularly the Indiamen, by English policies—besides that, several of the richest captures were actually freighted with consignments to English merchants.