Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 2 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor — John Shaqi
Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 2 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great ChancellorBusch, Moritz
History
Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 2 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor
Busch, Moritz
Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von, 1815-1898
a desire on their part, and not one of the conditions of payment. The
Frenchman then observed that negotiations with us would subject him to
less suspicion in Paris than would negotiations with the Versailles
Government. He further promised to release all German prisoners as
soon as he was informed who and where they were, and also to move at
once for the liberation of the Archbishop, whose imprisonment was an
inheritance from the first phase of the movement. Finally, he repeated
that the only important points were our neutrality and the abstention
from interference with their supplies, as from a military standpoint
the Versailles people caused him no anxiety.”
The Chief replied on the same day, that from this it appeared, if
Cluseret’s views could be accepted as authoritative in Paris, that
mediation between the latter and Versailles was not hopeless; those
views being more moderate than he had expected, particularly with
regard to disarmament. Fabrice might try to ascertain what Favre
thought of the first alternative. In the meantime our attitude should
be made to correspond with Cluseret’s expectations by observing
neutrality, and taking no part in the maintenance of the cordon round
Paris. A despatch setting forth the reasons for this course would be
sent to him, Fabrice, that day. The telegram concluded: “The demands of
the French negotiators in Brussels with respect to the five milliards
and the Eastern Railway show _qu’on se moque de nous_.”
These telegrams were supplemented by a further communication dated
the day before yesterday, which said that Fabrice should keep up the
relations that had been established with Cluseret, and should try to
ascertain whether he was of opinion that in case of the disarmament
of the city and its non-occupation by the Versailles troops it could
be garrisoned by our soldiers. If that were the case it would be
desirable to make a serious endeavour to mediate with Versailles.
Communal independence, after the fashion of the Prussian municipal
regulations, was not in itself an unreasonable demand, if no efforts
were made to secure communistic adjuncts. Perhaps it would be possible
to sever the reasonable communal movement from the international one.
If in doing this we succeeded in occupying Paris with the approval of
the two parties, guaranteeing communal independence until the French
had come to an understanding among themselves, and intervening with a
strong hand in restoring domestic peace in France, we should improve
our own position and gain fresh securities against possible bad faith
at Versailles. In these circumstances Fabrice was to avoid taking sides
in any way against the Parisians.
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