“And now,” he asked, “have I anything else for you? Unruh has published various things that should be refuted.” He took up the October number of the sixth year’s issue of the _Deutsche Revue_, which lay before him, and continued: “He maintains that he has written for historians, but he obviously intended to influence the elections. A great deal of it is erroneous, other portions are electioneering lies, and some parts require to be supplemented. Here, for instance, on page 9, he states that while I was still a member of Parliament I had a conversation with him which I concluded with the words: ‘Now I tell you, if your party is victorious, you shall take me under your wing, and if my side gets the upper hand I will do as much for you. Shake hands on it!’ This offer was actually made. And curiously enough, a similar proposal was made to me by d’Ester, the Radical member of Parliament. In this case, however, I declined, and said: ‘If your party wins, life will no longer be worth living, and if we have the upper hand, then hanging shall be the order of the day--but with all politeness, up to the very foot of the gallows.’” He turned over the leaves of the _Revue_, and continued: “There is no foundation whatever for the statement that the Opposition was not aware during the years 1862 to 1866 that I had a strong anti-Austrian policy in view. Besides, it is clear from Unruh’s own ‘Memoirs’ that they were fully informed respecting this policy, and only offered opposition through hatred to me, the Junker, and in consequence of their own dogmatism. Here, on page 11, it is stated that shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Austrian War in 1859, he had an interview with me at the Hotel Royal, when I said to him that for Prussia to come to the assistance of Austria would be an act of political suicide. I had entirely lost my sympathy for Austria. If we did not succeed in driving Austria out of Germany proper, and if she kept the upper hand here, then our Kings would once more be mere Electors and vassals of the Hapsburgs. There could be no doubt as to the attitude of the individual German Governments in case of a crisis. With the exception perhaps of a few of the minor States that fell within the sphere of Prussian influence, all of them, if forced to make a choice, would decide in favour of Austria. Prussia would, therefore, be isolated, but there were circumstances in which she might have the entire German people as her allies.... Surely that was plain speaking, and it ought not to have been difficult afterwards to recognise the connection between such language and the increase of the army. They would not see it, however.... On page 13 is another proof that they knew what I had in view: ‘When the King went to Baden-Baden, accompanied by the Ministers Von Auerswald and Von Schleinitz, Bismarck followed him, evidently with the object of continuing his efforts to prevent assistance being