rendered to Austria.’ And on the same page we read: ‘There is another circumstance which strikes one as an important piece of evidence to show that Bismarck’s anti-Austrian policy, in so far as Austrian influence in Germany was concerned, did not originate in 1859, but was of older date. After 1866, speaking in the House of Parliament to the former Landrath of the Teltower district, I related to him my conversation with Bismarck in 1859, whereupon he told me that Bismarck had expressed the same anti-Austrian views to him in 1854, and frankly confessed his anti-Austrian policy. It was not until 1866, that is to say, twelve years later, that it was practically applied. Bismarck had therefore kept this plan of driving Austria out of Germany before him all that time, and had resolutely pursued it. This is of some importance in forming an opinion upon the period of conflict.’ That is certainly correct. And is it possible that what that Landrath in 1854 and Unruh in 1859 ascertained from me personally had not also come to the knowledge of the others and been present to their minds when they--the Liberals--fought against me with the utmost violence from 1862 to 1866?” The Chancellor turned over a few further pages, and then continued: “With regard to the situation in the autumn of 1862, Unruh was convinced (page 15) that ‘if Bismarck desired to put an end to dualism in Germany, it was obviously impossible to do so without a war with Austria, and that for this purpose it was necessary to make the Prussian army as strong as possible.’ That is therefore what I have already told you. In October (page 16), during a general meeting of the National Union at Coburg, he communicated the conversation of 1859 to a confidential circle. He writes: ‘I told my old Prussian and my new German friends that they were quite mistaken in regarding Bismarck as a simple Reactionary or indeed as an instrument of reaction. He was certainly not a Liberal, but he had quite different ideas and plans in his head to those entertained by Manteuffel and his colleagues.’ The gentlemen were in doubt, and wanted to wait and see how I acted. In 1863 they would appear to have acquired the conviction (page 18) that I had given up my schemes of foreign policy, and was now nothing more than a reactionary Minister--of foreign policy, because (as they inferred by a most extraordinary process of reasoning) in the interval there had been in domestic affairs political persecution, measures against Liberal officials, restrictions on the liberty of the press, and attacks upon the freedom of speech in Parliament. But what in the world had that to do with my foreign policy, and the belief in my anti-Austrian schemes? Moreover, on the next page, one ascertains that at this period Unruh & Co. had received an assurance from a trustworthy source that I had a struggle with the Austrians in view. The writer of the ‘Memoirs’ reports: ‘Seidel, who was at that time