1. What were the actual means of government in the country, and the nature of the parochial, communal, borough, provincial and central administrative institutions, which had enabled the Greeks to maintain a war against Sultaun Mahmoud and Mahommed Ali for seven years? Enthusiasm and patriotism are good words in a debate, and may explain the events of a single campaign; but common sense tells every one that a people must possess some administrative institutions, in order to persist in a desperate struggle for many successive years. If Greece had no institutions in 1832, she was clearly unfit to receive a king; and the duty of the Three Protecting Powers was to frame a system of administration, not to choose a monarch. But on the other hand, if the foundations of political government already existed, it was especially the duty of Great Britain to see that these foundations or local institutions were improved, and not destroyed, by the new Government. 2. What were the land and sea forces necessary to maintain order on shore, and guard the Grecian seas from piracy; and how could these forces be immediately subjected to the system of discipline, which the protecting powers might consider indispensable? 3. What measures were requisite, in order to enable the mass of the population to turn their attention to profitable branches of industry without loss of time? And 4. What were the financial resources of the country? What was the amount of the debts contracted by the Government during the revolutionary war? What sum would be required to supply the deficit in the annual expenditure for the first year of the new monarch’s reign; and what sum would be required to be set apart annually for paying the interest of the debts of the Greek state, now converted into a European kingdom? Strange as it may seem, there is not the slightest information on these important questions in the papers laid before Parliament in 1832; and we believe that, had Lord Palmerston taken the trouble to collect even the limited information we have specified, before he involved Great Britain in a guarantee of King Otho’s throne, he would have perceived that it was not necessary to burden Greece either with a new debt or the presence of a foreign army. Great Britain would then have prevented the regency from destroying the existing institutions, and saved the country from the administrative corruption that ruined the despotic royalty of King Otho, and promises very soon to annihilate his constitutional monarchy.