This is a fact of our nature too well understood by those whose mind
labours with any store of fearful or bitter recollection, into which
they dread to look. The approach to some place hideous to the memory
produces the shivering of horror before it is beheld; and even within
the spirit, in like manner, the approach to those dark places of thought
where unsoothed sorrows lie buried, startles the mind, and warns it to
turn the steps of thought another way.
TALBOYS.
The feeling that “that way madness lies;” and the recoiling from it,
through a forefeeling of the pain which lies in the thoughts that might
arise, is common to all strong passion that has held long possession of
the mind.
NORTH.
A similar state is known in these imitations of passion, the works of
art;—Music has power over us, not by the feelings which it produces
distinctly in the mind, but by those many deep and passionate feelings
which it barely touches, and of which it raises up, therefore, from
moment to moment, obscure and undefined anticipations. In Painting, the
Imagination is most powerfully excited often not by what is shown, but
by what is dimly indicated. What is shown exhausts and limits the
feelings that belong to it; what is indicated merely, opens up an
insight into a whole world of feelings inexhaustible and illimitable.
SEWARD.
Such, indeed, is the nature of our mind; and these are examples of a
general principle of thought and feeling.
NORTH.
This capacity of the Mind to be affected in slighter degree, but in
similar manner, by anticipated feeling, is to be noticed in respect to
_all_ its more fixed and important emotions. It enters as a great
element into all its moral judgments. The judgment of right or wrong is
quick and decisive, but is rather unfrequently attended with very strong
emotion. Those strongest emotions belong to rare occurrences; for the
greater part of life is calm. But they have been felt, nevertheless, at
times; so that the soul distinctly knows what is its emotion of moral
abhorrence, and what its emotion of moral veneration. When lesser
occasions arise, which do not put its feeling to the proof, it still is
affected by a half-remembrance of what those feelings have been: a
slighter emotion comes over it—an apprehension of that emotion which
would be felt in strength, if it could be given way to. Thus even the
very name of crimes affects the mind with a dim horror, though the
Imagination is still remote from picturing to itself anything of the
reality of acting them. Whatever great conceptions, then, are so linked
in actual Nature with our moral emotions, that under the passionate
strength of these emotions they must arise, some slight shadow of the
same conceptions, some touch of the feelings which they are able to call
up, will be present to the mind whenever it is morally moved.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account