"I interpret the words, 'that the defendant _for his offences_ aforesaid, be fined and imprisoned,' in their plain literal sense, to mean _such offences as are set out in the counts of the indictment which are free from objection, and of which the defendant is shown by proper findings on the record to have been guilty_--that is in effect the offences contained in the fifth and eighth, and all the subsequent counts. And I see no objection to the word offences, in the plural, being used, whether the several counts last enumerated do intend several and distinct offences, or only one offence described in different manners in those counts. For whilst the record remains in that shape, and unreversed, there can be no objection in point of law, that they should be called 'offences' as they appear on the record." Now, however, let us see the view taken of the matter by Mr Baron Parke--a man undoubtedly of acute and powerful mind, as well as accurate and extensive learning. It is impossible not to be struck by the tone of diffidence which pervades his judgment; and it was _delivered_ in a very subdued manner, not usual with that learned judge; occasioned doubtless by the pain with which he found himself, on an occasion of such transcendent importance, differing from all his brethren but one. He commenced by acknowledging the astonishment with which he had heard counsel at the bar question the proposition _which he_ (Baron Parke) _had always considered_, ever since he had been in the profession, _perfectly settled and well established_, viz. that in criminal cases one good count, though associated with many bad ones, would, nevertheless, suffice to support a general judgment. But "he had been induced to _doubt_ whether the rule had not been carried too far, by a misunderstanding of the _dicta_ of judges on applications _in arrest of judgment_."