To enable the lay reader to appreciate the novel doctrine which has been sanctioned in the present case, it is requisite to understand clearly the distinction to which we have already briefly adverted, between a motion in _arrest of judgment_ and a _writ of error_. When a defendant has been found guilty of an offence by the verdict of a jury, judgment must follow as a matter of course, "_judgment_ being the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record."[11] If, however, the defendant can satisfy the court that the indictment is entirely defective, he will succeed in "_arresting,_" or staying the passing of judgment; but if he cannot, the court will proceed to _give judgment_. That judgment having been entered on the record, the defendant, if still persuaded that the indictment is defective, and consequently the judgment given on it erroneous, has one more chance; viz. to _reverse_ the judgment which has been so given, by bringing a writ of error before an appellate tribunal. Now, the exact proposition for which the traversers' counsel contended was this--that the rule that "one good count will sustain a general judgment, though there are also bad counts in the indictment," is applicable to that stage only of the proceedings at which a motion is made in arrest of judgment; _i. e. before the judgment has been actually given_, and not to the stage at which a writ of error has been obtained, viz. _after the judgment has been actually given_. This proposition was adopted by Mr Justice Coltman; while Mr Baron Parke--for reasons substantially identical with those of Lords Denman, Cottenham, and Campbell--declared himself unable to overthrow it. As to the "opinion that one good count, properly found, will support a judgment warranted by it, whatever bad counts there may be," Mr Baron Parke said,--"I doubt whether this received opinion is so sufficiently established by a course of usage and practical recognition, though generally entertained, as to compel its adoption in the present case, and prevent me considering its propriety. After much anxious consideration, and weighing the difficulties of reconciling such a doctrine with principle, I feel so much doubt, that I cannot bring myself to concur with the majority of the judges upon this question."