With the elapse of all this time (96 hours instead of the 24 hours expected), General Watson was forced to alter his plans for the final phase of the operation: the assault on Parry. He brought down from Engebi the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 22d Marines, pulled that regiment’s other (3d) battalion off Eniwetok, and designated them for the landing on Parry. Amidst all of this purposeful activity, the ludicrous side of war emerged in one episode. A U.S. float plane moored in the lagoon, and a boat was sent to take off the crew. Coming alongside, the boat cleverly managed to capsize the plane. [Illustration: Department of Defense Photo (Navy) 217679 _Waves of amtracs, each one crammed with Marines uncertain of what they will find when they hit the beach, churn in for the assault of Engebi on 18 February 1944. They are hoping to find an enemy dazed by the preparatory artillery fire._] The exact timing of an amphibious assault is a crucial decision based on a delicate balancing of a host of factors, such as the condition of the troops and their equipment, provision of fire support, etc. General Watson decided to hold off the landing on Parry until D plus 5 (22 February). An official report explained the reasons for the delay: (a) To rehabilitate and reorganize [the battalion of the 22d Marines] which had been in action for three successive days. (b) To reembark, repair, and service medium tanks and rest their crews. (c) To make light tanks, which were still engaged on Eniwetok, available for the assault on Parry Island if required. (d) To provide one [battalion] of the 106th Infantry as support reserve in the event it was required. (e) To allow additional time for the air and surface bombardment of Parry. Awaiting the amtracs of the 22d Marines, the Japanese commander on the island issued a very succinct order to his troops: At the edge of the water scatter and divide the enemy infantry in their boats--attack and annihilate each one. Launch cleverly prepared powerful quick thrusts and vivid sudden attacks, and after having attacked and having destroyed the enemy landing forces, first of all, then scatter and break up their groups of boats and ships. In the event that the enemy succeeds in making a landing annihilate him by means of night attacks. The enemy plans to “annihilate” failed. For two days before the Marine assault, the Navy had moved its big guns in as close as 850 yards offshore and pounded the defenders with 944 tons of shells. This was supplemented by artillery fire from the neighboring islands and rocket fire from the gunboats as the Marines went in. This rain of shells crept ahead of the tanks and infantrymen as they tenaciously slogged their way across the island. [Illustration: ENIWETOK (DOWNSIDE) ATOLL