British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
William, to do him justice, had strained every nerve to spur his
indolent allies to be first in the field. The contingents, awaked
by the sudden stroke at Namur, came in fast to Brussels; but it was
too late. The French had destroyed all forage and supplies on the
direct route to Namur, and William’s only way to the city lay across
the Mehaigne. Behind the Mehaigne lay Luxemburg, the ablest of the
French generals. The best of luck was essential to William’s success,
and instead of the best came the worst. Heavy rain swelled the
narrow stream into a broad flood, and the building of bridges became
impossible. There was beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more
skilful parry, between the two generals, but William could not get
under Luxemburg’s guard. ◆May 26./June 5.◆ On the 5th of June, after a
discreditably short defence, Namur fell, almost before William’s eyes,
into the hands of the French.
Then Luxemburg thought it time to draw the enemy away from the vicinity
of the captured city; so recrossing the Sambre, and keeping Boufflers
always between himself and that river, he marched for the Senne as if
to threaten Brussels. William followed, as in duty bound; and French
and Allies pursued a parallel course to the Senne, William on the north
and Luxemburg on the south. ◆July 23./Aug. 2.◆ The 2nd of August found
both armies across the Senne, William at Hal, facing west with the
river in his rear, and Luxemburg some five miles south of him with his
right at Steenkirk, and his centre between Hoves and Enghien, while
Boufflers lay at Manny St. Jean, seven miles in his rear.
The terrible state of the roads owing to heavy rain had induced
Luxemburg to leave most of his artillery at Mons; and, as he had
designed merely to tempt the Allies away from Namur, the principal
object left to him was to take up a strong position wherein his worn
and harassed army could watch the enemy without fear of attack. Such
a position he thought that he had found at Steenkirk.[6] The country
at this point is more broken and rugged than is usual in Belgium. The
camp lay on high ground, with its right resting on the river Sennette
and its fight front covered by a ravine, which gradually fades away
northward into a high plateau of about a mile in extent. Beyond the
ravine was a network of wooded defiles, through which Luxemburg seems
to have hoped that no enemy could fall upon him in force unawares. It
so happened, however, that one of his most useful spies was detected,
in his true character, in William’s camp at Hal; and this was an
opportunity not to be lost. A pistol was held to the spy’s head, and
he was ordered to write a letter to Luxemburg, announcing that large
bodies of the enemy would be in motion next morning, but that nothing
more serious was contemplated than a foraging expedition. This done,
William laid his plans to surprise his enemy on the morrow.
[Illustration:
STEENKIRK
July 24rd./Aug. 3rd. 1692.
_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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