This affair closed about two p.m. From prisoners captured we obtained positive information that a portion of Ewell's corps was engaged in the action, and that the whole corps, twenty thousand strong, under the command of Lieutenant General Early, was either already in Lynchburg or near at hand. The detachment sent by General Averell to operate on our right had returned, reporting that they had encountered a large body of rebel cavalry in that quarter, while Duffie, although holding his position, sent word that he was pressed by a superior force. It had now become sufficiently evident that the enemy had concentrated a force of at least double the numerical strength of mine, and what added to the gravity of the situation was the fact that my troops had scarcely enough of ammunition left to sustain another well-contested battle. I immediately ordered all the baggage and supply trains to retire by the Bedford turnpike, and made preparation to withdraw the army as soon as it should become sufficiently dark to conceal the movement from the enemy. Meanwhile, as there still remained five hours of daylight, they were ordered to maintain a firm front, and with skirmishers to press the enemy's lines at all points. I have since learned that Early's whole force was up in time to have made a general attack on the same afternoon (18th)--an attack which under the circumstances would probably have been fatal to us; but, rendered cautious by the bloody repulse of Breckinridge, and deceived by the firm attitude of my command, he devoted the afternoon to refreshment and repose, expecting to strike a decisive blow on the following morning. As soon as it became dark I quietly withdrew my whole force, leaving a line of pickets close to the enemy, with orders to remain until twelve o'clock (midnight), and then follow the main body. This was successfully accomplished without loss of men or material, excepting only a few wounded who were left in a temporary hospital by mistake." By a critical examination and comparison of these reports it will be seen that the men who did the fighting say nothing of the Confederate force being "disgracefully routed," or of their "overwhelming numbers," and maintain a prudent silence as to the cause of Hunter's withdrawal. No one can read the whole correspondence without being satisfied that such men as Averell, Crook, Sullivan and Hayes, who seemed to have all been gallant soldiers, were much discouraged and had no faith in Hunter. They believed they could have forced their way through our lines and were anxious to do so, for they knew that they had force superior both in numbers and equipment. Believing this, they were chagrined that a retreat was ordered just as victory was apparently within their grasp.