My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division. As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of different strength, and to group several of these to constitute Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a particular strategical direction--_i.e._, in a particular portion of the theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, or even regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the moment can best dispense with Cavalry support. Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations--that is to say, on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols. If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry, from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary difficulties.