If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's Cavalry out of the field at the very commencement of the campaign which compels the concentration of important numbers in the decisive direction, it follows naturally that this point of view must be fully considered in the plan of strategical deployment. In the further stages of Cavalry activity--_i.e._, after it has defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry--the tasks which can confront the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless, as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they offer. First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in poor and almost roadless districts. If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in advance! It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the insertion of an additional collecting station--viz., the Corps Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown to be groundless, for in any case where at all large bodies of Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must be organized in such a manner that all really important information will be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the usual channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry Divisions, there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher commands. More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties, and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manoeuvres) of the Division on the battle-field.