Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical EssaysPeirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Philosophy
Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays
Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Metaphysics; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 -- Bibliography; Pragmatism; Science -- Philosophy
that a thing is blue or green, but the quality of being blue and the
quality of being green are not things which we see; they are products of
logical reflections. The truth is, that common-sense, or thought as it
first emerges above the level of the narrowly practical, is deeply
imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet _metaphysical_
is commonly applied; and nothing can clear it up but a severe course of
logic.
III
We generally know when we wish to ask a question and when we wish to
pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity between the sensation
of doubting and that of believing.
But this is not all which distinguishes doubt from belief. There is a
practical difference. Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our
actions. The Assassins, or followers of the Old Man of the Mountain,
used to rush into death at his least command, because they believed that
obedience to him would insure everlasting felicity. Had they doubted
this, they would not have acted as they did. So it is with every belief,
according to its degree. The feeling of believing is a more or less sure
indication of there being established in our nature some habit which
will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect.
Nor must we overlook a third point of difference. Doubt is an uneasy and
dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass
into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory
state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in
anything else.[30] On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to
believing, but to believing just what we do believe.
Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, though very
different ones. Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into
such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the
occasion arises. Doubt has not the least effect of this sort, but
stimulates us to action until it is destroyed. This reminds us of the
irritation of a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby; while for
the analogue of belief, in the nervous system, we must look to what are
called nervous associations—for example, to that habit of the nerves in
consequence of which the smell of a peach will make the mouth water.
IV
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I
shall term this struggle _inquiry_, though it must be admitted that this
is sometimes not a very apt designation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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